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Abstract: Although Germany initiated a far-reaching defence reform process in 2003, it has 
faced criticism from its NATO Alliance partners for its reticence to contribute to higher-intensity 
operations under ISAF. The majority of the academic literature focuses upon the impact of 
German security culture on the willingness of policy leaders to sanction a more offensive role 
for the Bundeswehr. This study explores two neglected dimensions of reform which have an 
important impact on the Bundeswehr’s ability to undertake full-spectrum operations: military 
doctrine and capabilities. It finds that low ‘executive autonomy’ continues to incentivise an 
inappropriate level of political interference in doctrinal development and constrains the ability of 
the core executive to overcome the impact of organisational politics between the individual 
Services on capability investment. However, the article uncovers indicators that the 
Bundeswehr is beginning to exhibit greater tactical and operational dynamism, following 
experiences under ISAF and reforms to the ‘lessons-learned process’.  
 
Introduction 
 
In the mid-2000s Germany began a far-reaching defence reform process centered on a 
selective emulation of the concepts and capabilities associated with the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). These reforms were designed to enable the Bundeswehr to contribute to global, 
full-spectrum operations. Germany has, however, faced sharp criticism from NATO Alliance 
partners for its reticence to contribute to higher-intensity operations under ISAF.1 The majority 
of the academic literature focuses upon the impact of German security culture on the 
willingness of policy leaders to sanction a more offensive role for the Bundeswehr.2 In contrast, 
this study argues that low ‘executive autonomy’ deriving from a set of restrictive domestic 
material power relations has slowed Germany’s convergence with the dictates of international 
structure.  
The article explores, in particular, two related yet neglected dimensions of reform 
which have an important impact on the Bundeswehr’s ability to undertake full-spectrum 
operations: military doctrine and capabilities. It finds that low executive autonomy continues to 
incentivise an inappropriate level of political interference in doctrinal development and 
constrains the core executive’s ability to overcome the impact of organisational politics between 
the individual Services on capability investment. However, the study also uncovers indicators 
that the Bundeswehr is beginning to exhibit greater tactical/operational dynamism, following 
experiences under ISAF and reforms to the ‘lessons-learned process’. The article begins by 
briefly examining recent US and European defence reforms and the German emulation of the 
key concepts and capabilities which have characterised the reforms of her NATO partners. The 
study proceeds by focusing on the process of doctrinal adaptation to the international security 
environment and examines the management of military input to defence planning. 
 
The Context: US and European Defence Reforms 
 
Post-Cold War US defence reform has been informed by the RMA that has coalesced around 
three features. Firstly, expeditionary forces characterised by joint command structures. 3 
Secondly, a shift from weapons platforms to knowledge-empowered networked forces capable 
of exercising agility and precision in the application of attritional force (Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW)).4 Effects Based Operations (EBO) has taken centre-stage in conceptual development 
on NCW and formed, until 2006, the third key feature of US transformation.5 EBO, as Ho 
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demonstrates, are characterised by three dimensions. Firstly, a tactical dimension: ‘strategy to 
task links, the integration with other planning processes and the use of both military and non-
military means to prosecute the adversary’.6 Secondly, an operational dimension: the conduct 
of rapid, decisive operations involving close networked coordination to reduce battlefield 
uncertainty.7 Finally, a strategic dimension: the use of networked activities and the mobilisation 
of all sources of national power (political, economic, military and diplomatic) to achieve first-, 
second- and third-order strategic effects against near-peer competitors.8 
However, conflict in Iraq post-2003, Afghanistan and the Israeli experience with EBO in 
the 2006 Second Lebanon War highlighted significant deficits in NCW and EBO in 
Stabilisation/Counterinsurgency (COIN).9 These problems were recognised in the 2006 ‘FM 3-
24 Joint US Army/Marines Counter-Insurgency Doctrine Field Manual’ that emphasises 
cultural/anthropological approaches and institution-building. 10  The April 2009 US Defence 
Budget also signalled a focus on capabilities and forces suited to irregular conflict, cutting key 
RMA programmes.11 Doctrinal and conceptual changes have also been initiated, particularly 
since the 2007 appointment of General James Mattis as Commander of US Joint Forces 
Command, who removed EBO from US Joint Doctrine in August 2008.   
British and French defence reforms have involved a partial and selective emulation of 
the RMA. Firstly, the restructuring of command structures and development of joint, 
expeditionary forces: a process that began in France in 1995/96 and in Britain in 1997/98. 
Secondly, during the early-mid 2000s, the development of Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) 
that seeks to exploit technology’s tactical and operational advantages, but is more wary about 
networking’s potential to transform warfare and deliver strategic effects.12 Finally, the UK and 
France developed an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). EBAO recognises that it 
is not military operations themselves which have changed in character, but the approach to 
operations. It is conceived of as an approach that, embedded within the Comprehensive 
Approach (a multi-agency, cross- government approach to the planning and execution of 
operations) can facilitate the integration of all agencies of government in the delivery of both 
kinetic and non-kinetic effects.13 Since the decline of EBO, UK EBAO has given way to an 
emphasis on ‘Effects-Based Thinking’ that shuns the determinism of EBAO, while recognising 
EBAO’s utility in targeting ‘closed systems’.14   
 
Germany’s Selective Emulation of the RMA 
 
Networked Operational Command Doctrine 
 
Until 2003 German defence reform was evolutionary. Only in the 2003 Defence Policy 
Guidelines (VPR) did SPD Defence Minister Peter Struck (2002-05) jettison territorial defence 
in favour of expeditionary crisis-management and prevention.15 The reform restructured the 
military into a 35,000-strong Eingreifskraefte (‘Rapid-Reaction Force’) designed for higher-
intensity warfare; 70,000 Stabilisation Troops for low to medium-intensity missions and 147,500 
support/logistical forces. The 2006 DWP also outlined the implications of ‘transformation’ for 
Army, Navy and Airforce command structures in greater detail by building upon the 
modularisation of forces outlined in the 2003 VPR.16 These structural reforms have been 
accompanied by defence capability acquisition enhancing effective engagement and tactical 
and strategic mobility.17  
Mirroring Britain and France’s identification of the likelihood of ‘Three Block Warfare’18 
characterising short to medium-term conflict scenarios, the VPR recognised that there are ‘no 
clear cut dividing lines between the various types of operations’.19 Hence, while German 
thinking on networking (Networked Operational Command Doctrine (NetOpFü)) was initially 
closely associated with NCW,20 the selective emulation of the RMA undertaken by Britain and 
France that focused on the adaptation of RMA technologies to deliver both kinetic and non-
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kinetic effects, provided a strong indication of ‘best practice’ in networking. 21  These 
observations have combined with Germany’s experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan to 
ensure that NetOpFü emphasises the capacity of RMA technologies to facilitate the speedy, 
efficient application of military action ‘across the entire conflict spectrum’. 22  Germany’s 
understanding of networking’s potential contribution resonates with the British ‘Manoeuvrist 
Approach’ that lies at the heart of NEC. Operational experiences in complex crisis-
management operations have reinforced the importance of Auftragstaktik (mission command), 
a principle that has been central to German military thinking since the Prussian General Staff. 23 
Rather than the NCW’s capacity to mass firepower and attrition, NetOpFü is, therefore, 
conceived of as a means to enable troops to overcome the impediments of military hierarchy 
and act with greater speed and adaptability.24  
 
Poor C2ISR and Power Projection Capabilities 
 
Operation Allied Force (1999) acted as a particularly important impetus to C2ISR (Command, 
Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) investment, highlighting the need to 
enhance interoperability with Alliance partners and reduce dependence on US intelligence.25 A 
set of investments have, therefore, been instigated since the early 2000s to develop the 
foundations for a network-enabled Bundeswehr, including joint, interoperable, networked radio 
equipment and investment in a joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network.26  
Despite advances in networking, post-unification restrictions on defence spending and 
the late shift towards crisis-management have delayed C2ISR’s introduction 27  The 
Bundeswehr’s focus is on dealing with C2’s implications for command structures through joint 
military exercises and it will not enjoy an initial network enabled capability until 2013.28 The 
Bundeswehr is currently struggling with the creation of a joint operational picture where the 
three main Services and their different levels of command receive relevant information.29  
German units will only be capable of fielding advanced NEC that will achieve shorter reaction 
cycles by 2020/21 at the earliest.30 Consequently, Germany has faced significant C2 problems 
in Afghanistan.31 Furthermore, several ongoing procurement programmes are more suitable to 
Cold War conflict scenarios and drain funds from frontline equipment. 32 Such programmes 
include the 2005/06 acquisition of eight P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft and 
2005/06 ordering of two U212 submarines.33 As this article will demonstrate, this problem has 
been compounded by the impact of organisational politics between the individual Services.  
 
EBAO: Reactive Doctrinal Development 
 
German thinking on EBAO accelerated following EBAO’s conceptual development within NATO 
after the November 2006 Riga Summit. The Luftwaffe took a prominent role in conceptual 
development, seeing in EBAO an opportunity to expand its role beyond reconnaissance and 
strategic lift and released ‘The Conceptual Ground Rules of the Luftwaffe on EBAO’ (KGv Lw 
zu EBAO) in May 2007.34 KGv Lw zu EBAO encountered resistance within the Army, who 
viewed it as overly-formalistic and mechanistic because of its focus on quantitative measures of 
effectiveness.35  For the Army, this approach appeared to impose a level of rigidity and 
assumption of knowledge of the operational environment that would be unachievable at the 
tactical level.36 KGv Lw zu EBAO threatened to undermine the Auftragstaktik and was at odds 
with the Army’s operational experiences in the Balkans/Afghanistan.37 The Army has instead 
been receptive to ‘Effects-Based Thinking’ that coheres closely with its traditional approach to 
military planning: imagining the preferred end-state and considering the range of kinetic and 
non-kinetic means required to achieve outcomes. The Army also welcomed the capacity of 
Effects-Based Thinking to help facilitate the integration of civilian actors in the planning and 
conduct of operations.38  
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While ‘KGv Lw zu EBAO’ initially enjoyed support outside the Luftwaffe, particularly 
within the Bundeswehr Transformation Centre (BTC), the Army’s position has been 
strengthened by operational experience and US/Israeli experiences with EBO.39 EBO’s decline 
has created some uncertainty about EBAO’s status as an organising concept of 
transformation.40 However, much will depend upon the position adopted by NATO, highlighting 
the reactiveness of German doctrine. These debates are, in any case theoretical, as NetOpFü 
is not sufficiently advanced to deliver a joint operational picture that will shorten reaction cycles.  
 
‘Faktor Mensch’ and Networked Security 
 
Like British and French NEC, NetOpFü is also based upon scepticism of technology’s ability to 
transform conflict. NetOpFü emphasises Faktor Mensch41 (the human factor) as the decisive 
element in successfully harnessing technological advantage on the battlefield. Training is 
viewed as critical, particularly to enable lower-levels of command to undertake quick and 
independent decision-making. 42 NetOpFü is also predicated on the assumption that technology 
is no substitute for a close understanding of the cultural context of land operations.43 The 
Bundeswehr has, therefore, focused upon the social, intercultural and foreign language skills 
necessary for ‘wars amongst the people’.44 Although these assets have been part of general 
and pre-deployment training for soldiers since operations in the former-Yugoslavia, recent 
experiences in Afghanistan led to the development of two organizations in 2009 to take the 
lead on cultural training and advice: The Central Coordination Group for Inter-Cultural 
Competence and Centre for Intercultural Mission Advice.45 Furthermore, NetOpFü and EBAO 
are situated firmly within the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, termed ‘Networked Security’ that aims 
to enable the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic elements of national power.  
 
Executive Autonomy and the Pace of Reform: The Long Road to Convergence 
The Bundeswehr is, therefore, converging with the defence reforms of the US and its European 
partners. This isomorphism reflects the insights of Neo-Realism46: that the changing systemic 
distribution of capabilities and new security challenges, coupled with the necessity of survival in 
a ‘self-help’ world leads to the emulation of ‘best practice’ in military affairs.47  However, the 
temporal delay in German reform cannot be explained by Neo-Realism and necessitates a 
focus on domestic factors and the insights of Neoclassical Realism. Neoclassical Realism 
argues that while states of similar relative power and geographical position will seek to 
maximise their relative power over the long-term, they vary in ‘state power’ (in their ability to 
extract resources from society) leading to short to medium-term temporal divergence with the 
dictates of international structure.48        
 The decisive intervening factor determining the pace of German defence reform is a 
set of restrictive domestic material power relations which have restricted the core executive’s 
autonomy in defence policy.49 Germany’s status as a federal democracy increases the core 
executive’s sensitivity to the politics of military base closures, disincentivising radical structural 
reform.50 Despite the clear redundancy of conscription by the late 1990s, the close linkages 
between financial, budgetary and social policy deriving from the large number of conscientious 
objectors providing cheap labour for the social system also created a powerful material 
constraint on the core executive’s ability to create a fully professional armed force.51 These 
interlinked policy subsystems led the German Finance Ministry to promote stasis on structural 
reform of the Bundeswehr due to the negative repercussions for German adherence to EMU’s 
Stability and Growth Pact and budget consolidation. 52  Military transformation and C2ISR 
investment has also been impeded by restrictions on executive autonomy deriving from the 
fiscal constraints associated with reunification.53  
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‘Executive autonomy’ is further compromised by the diffusion of competencies on 
defence policy within the core executive anchored in the Basic Law. Although the Chancellor 
plays a central role in formulating general policy guidelines, the Defence Minister emerges as 
crucial in the implementation of policy and in controlling the scope and temporality of policy 
change.54 However, for Defence Ministers with political ambition of the Chancellorship this 
room for manoeuvre provides an opportunity to steer-clear of upsetting the Finance Ministry by 
not questioning conscription and to avoid incurring the wrath of powerful Regional ‘power 
barons’ in their party through base closures.55 Hence only in mid-2010, in the context of 
proposed cuts of 10% in the defence budget and the overwhelming clarity of conscription’s 
irrelevance to the contemporary operational environment did Defence Minister Karl Theodore 
zu Guttenberg act as a policy entrepreneur on behalf of a professional armed force.56 In doing 
so, zu Guttenberg was able to build upon the ‘policy learning’ processes instigated by an 
advocacy coalition opposed to conscription with its roots in the Greens, FDP, and some 
sections of the SPD and CDU that had become increasingly prominent during the early 21st 
Century.57     
The Bundestag’s constitutionally-mandated oversight powers over expeditionary troop 
deployments also appear to circumscribe executive autonomy. 58  The Bundestag enjoys 
extensive powers: a simple Parliamentary majority is required for the prior approval of overseas 
troop deployment. The Bundestag can also control a mission’s mandate, make decisions on 
operational issues (rules of engagement (RoE), command and control, risk assessment and 
budget) and mission duration.59 From a Realist perspective, stricter parliamentary oversight 
presents a limited constraint on executive autonomy, given the malleability of strategic culture 
and the policy leaders’ ability to exploit ‘public vulnerability’ in the mobilisation of society.60 Yet, 
although culture displays malleability it can under particular circumstances, be a difficult tool to 
wield. This is the case in Germany, where the Cold War systemic imperatives incentivised the 
construction of an ‘anti-militaristic’ policy narrative requiring extensive remoulding to fit post-
Cold War expeditionary challenges.  
However, the key difficulty lies not in culture itself, but in the impact of domestic 
material power relations on the core executive’s ability to reshape culture. In Britain and 
France, the unitary state provides a sustained window of opportunity between elections for 
policy leaders to deploy culture in the articulation of new policy narratives supporting significant 
changes to the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defence policy.61 In contrast, 
the German federal system constrains on the core executive’s capacity to deploy culture as a 
tool in the mobilisation of society. These constraints stem from regular state elections with 
important implications for the governing coalition’s ability to enact its broader political agenda. 
In the absence of a clear sense of public vulnerability deriving from pressing crisis, such 
restrictions on executive autonomy can foster sensitivity to public opinion and parliamentary 
opposition, incentivising the temporal management of reform and a ‘salami-slicing’ approach to 
policy change.62  
The impact of ‘culture’ and ‘executive autonomy’ on the strategic direction of German 
defence reform and on the willingness of policy makers to sanction a more offensive role for the 
Bundeswehr has received significant attention in the academic literature.63 This article focuses 
on the impact of the temporal management of convergence on Germany’s ability to contribute 
to higher-intensity missions under ISAF. Firstly, the limitations imposed by the current doctrine 
and training of the Bundeswehr. The German military has only recently begun a transformation 
process that will allow it to adapt to the contemporary operational environment. This 
disadvantage is compounded by the Bundeswehr’s lack of historical experience in COIN and 
continued political interference in doctrinal development. Secondly, organisational politics 
between the Single Services (the impact of which has been heightened by low executive 
autonomy), has also reduced the dynamism of capability procurement. In short, the temporal 
management of reform to the objectives of defence policy has had an important knock-on effect 
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on military doctrine and capabilities, which has further complicated and delayed Germany’s 
convergence with military ‘best practice’ and the dictates of ‘international structure’.  
 
Doctrinal Weaknesses: Denkverbot vs. Operational Experiences 
 
The core executive’s temporal management of reform has hindered conceptual and doctrinal 
development. It is only comparatively recently that the German Defence Ministry (BMVg) has 
been liberated from the ‘Denkverbot’ (ban on thinking) on conceptual development around 
expeditionary crisis-management.64 While the CDU/CSU government of Angela Merkel looks 
likely to suspend conscription after the CDU reached agreement on the issue with the CSU in 
September 2010, a ‘Denkverbot’ within the Defence Ministry had long been applied to the 
question of whether conscription was of use to the contemporary operational environment. 
Furthermore, the ‘ban on thinking’ within the Defence Ministry has also been applied to the 
development of COIN doctrine that will enhance the ability of the Bundeswehr to act effectively 
in ‘Three Block Warfare’ situations.     
The majority of German operational experiences during the early-mid 1990s involved 
low-medium intensity tasks. 65  Nevertheless, these operations began to highlight that the 
Bundeswehr would have to be prepared to deploy ‘minimum force’ in complex crisis-
management operations not only in the ‘initial-entry’ stage, but also to protect civilians in land 
operations ‘amongst the people’.66 However, exposure to peace-support operations in the 
Balkans during the 1990s engendered a strong focus on the necessity to develop the lower-
intensity skill sets for ‘conflict amongst the people’.67 German experience of low-medium 
intensity peace-support operations reinforced Innere Führung that, amongst other values, 
points to the centrality of culturally-aware and educated soldiers.68 The importance of these 
skills sets has been bolstered by observation of the RMA in practice, particularly the lessons 
that FM 3-24 draws from the experiences of the US Infantry and Marines in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.69 The emphasis on humanitarian and civilian tasks also highlighted at an early stage the 
importance of ‘networked security’, as German deployments proceeded in close cooperation 
with NGOs and the German Foreign, Interior, Development Ministries.70 
Skill sets at the lower-end of the conflict spectrum have, however, been developed at 
the expense of preparation for higher-intensity ‘Three Block Warfare’ situations. As Dalgaard-
Nielsen notes: ‘The cult of the warrior was weak or absent within the Bundeswehr…’.71 Matlary 
also highlights how: ‘German troops have an unflattering history of being reticent to fight in 
situations where it is needed, such as in Prizren in Kosovo in 2004 where they were accused of 
“hiding in the barracks like frightened rabbits” in a German police report’.72 Such accusations of 
cowardice neglect the impact of excessive civilian interference in military planning that has left 
soldiers with inappropriate doctrine and training for ISAF. The military’s non-offensive military 
doctrine had also been reinforced by the nature of post-Cold War operational experiences. 
ISAF is the first time German troops have been exposed to intensive and sustained fighting 
since WW2. Soldiers trained for high-intensity conventional conflict scenarios during the Cold 
War, but did not expect conflict to arise. In contrast, the British and French militaries gained 
significant experience of complex land operations ‘amongst the people’ during decolonisation. 
Pre-operational training during the 1990s prepared German units for the ‘worst case scenario’, 
yet the majority of missions undertaken in the Balkans were ‘only slightly more dangerous than 
staying in Germany’.73  
The Bundeswehr’s non-offensive approach was outlined in Truppenfuehrung von 
Landstreitkraeften Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/100 (HDv 100/100) that was updated in 2000 
following deployment in Bosnia. In contrast to British and French Army doctrine that by 1997 
pointed to the need to prepare for operations characterised by a ‘continuum of conflict’, the 
doctrine separated fighting, peace-support and humanitarian aid into distinct categories.74 HDV 
100/100 was updated in 2007 and now emphasises the potential for ‘reversibility’ in conflict 
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situations. Yet the document continues to place a stronger emphasis on the non-kinetic aspects 
of operations than British and French approaches to Stabilisation and does not outline an 
explicit COIN doctrine.75 HDV 100/100 fails to deliver a coherent picture of how to undertake 
‘Three Block Warfare’ and combine low and high-intensity actions in ‘conflict amongst the 
people’. The Einsatzkonzept Operationen gegen Irregulaere Kraefte (Guidelines for Operations 
against Irregular Forces) of 2005 offers some guidance on the kinetic dimensions of conflict 
against irregular forces, yet it fails to integrate the non-kinetic aspects of COIN and does not 
represent a comprehensive COIN doctrine.76  
 The lower-intensity operational experiences of the initial post-Cold War era are also 
reflected in structural reforms which created separate low-medium intensity ‘Stabilisation’ 
forces and higher-intensity Eingreifskraefte. Although the Stabilisation Forces are capable of 
more robust tasks and are interoperable with the Eingreifskraefte, they lack the capacity to 
undertake the tasks associated with highest-end of ‘Three Block Warfare’ and the ‘clear’ and 
‘hold’ stages of COIN. 
Hence, despite the 2003 VPR’s recognition of the growing tendency of operations to 
vary quickly in intensity, it is only following recent ISAF operations that the Bundeswehr has 
begun to earnestly consider the implications of ‘Three Block Warfare’ for doctrine, force 
structures and capabilities. Since 2006, as the security situation in Northern Afghanistan has 
shifted from Stabilisation to COIN, ISAF has highlighted the necessity for land forces to be able 
to simultaneously apply kinetic and non-kinetic effects.77 However, the Bundeswehr continues 
to suffer the effects of a ‘Denkverbot’ on COIN applied by a core executive that, due to the 
constraints of the Federal system on executive autonomy, is highly-sensitive to the implications 
of radical change to the Bundeswehr’s role. The Army must, therefore, tread a delicate line 
between putting in place the foundations for higher-intensity operations without officially writing 
COIN doctrine. Doctrine writers cannot overstep the parameters set by the ‘salami-tactic’ of 
their political masters, who have, so far, portrayed the ISAF mission as one of classic 
stabilisation.78 
Two factors have also emerged which threaten to undermine the centrality of the 
principles of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Auftragstaktik. Firstly, the practical experience of 
digitisation in exercises has led to the temptation for commanders to involve themselves in the 
‘tactical weeds’.79 Secondly, networking has been accompanied by enhanced accountability. 
While the ‘fog of war’ once made it difficult to discern whether correct procedure has been 
followed, digitisation leads to a ‘data trail’ that could end in prosecution for commanders. After 
the September 2009 Kunduz air-strike that resulted in numerous civilian casualties, there has 
been a reticence amongst commanders in the field take the initiative.80 Decisions are now 
taken at an increasingly high-level of command. Commanders are gathering inappropriate 
levels of information and are being pulled down to the detailed tactical level, in order to protect 
themselves from prosecution.81 
 Hence, as a result of low executive autonomy and the incentivises this provides for 
civilian interference in the development of military doctrine, as well as the impact of the largely 
low-medium intensity post-Cold War German operational experiences, the Bundeswehr is 
struggling to integrate high- and low-intensity effects in ‘conflict amongst the people’. This 
problem has been magnified by the temporal delay in the development of NetOpFü that has 
made determining the role of C2ISR in ‘Three Block Warfare’ a particularly pressing 
challenge.82 Furthermore, the classified nature of military doctrine reduces the Bundeswehr’s 
ability to work with external actors and impedes ‘networked security’ and makes doctrine 
unavailable to reservists when not on operation.83  
 
Signs of Adaptation to the Operational Environment 
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Despite these constraints, there are signs of adaptation to the operational environment and of a 
gradual lifting of the Denkverbot. German experiences in Afghanistan have begun to 
demonstrate the urgency of preparing land forces for rapid reversibility in conflict intensity.84 US 
pressure for more robust involvement led Germany to take command of Regional Command 
North in June 2008 and to participation in higher-intensity operations like Operation Harekate 
Yolo II (October 2007).85 The operation involved offensive military action and highlighted the 
Bundeswehr’s deficiencies in undertaking COIN, particularly its inability to effectively integrate 
low and high-intensity tasks.86 These conclusions have been underlined by Operation Eagle 
that provided security in Kunduz before the Afghan elections in August 2009 and involved the 
use of heavy artillery and the Luftwaffe in close ground-support. German leadership, since mid-
2007, of the ISAF Quick-Reaction Force in Northern Afghanistan has also provided operational 
experience at the higher-intensity end of the conflict spectrum.87 Furthermore, on 26 January 
2010 the German government announced an increase of its contingent under Regional 
Command North by 500 troops (as well as a flexible reserve of 350 troops). This extra 
deployment will increase the Bundeswehr’s presence on the ground and ability to actively 
protect the population as well as train Afghan troops (a task that will involve high-intensity 
fighting alongside Afghans).88  
Debate upon the key competencies necessary for German land forces has sharpened. 
There is a growing recognition of the need to tailor training to the challenges of Three Block 
Warfare and to focus not only on ‘intercultural competence’, ‘intelligence’, ‘strategic ability’, the 
‘ability to organise under pressure’ and ‘the capacity to work as part of multinational forces’, but 
also on ‘resilience/character’ and ‘warrior qualities’.89 Germany is taking steps to overcome its 
deficiencies in irregular conflict. The military hierarchy 90  has begun to regard conflict in 
Afghanistan, as ‘Three Block Operations’91, rather than classic Stabilisation.92 The Army is, 
therefore interpreting the concept of ‘Stabilisation’ as broadly as possible. Doctrine writers are 
quietly building the intellectual foundations for a comprehensive COIN doctrine as a 
supplement to Army stabilisation doctrine by gathering and reflecting upon the lessons of 
operational experience and undertaking detailed analysis of British, French and US COIN.93  
While doctrine does not reflect the nature of operations under ISAF, training has, since 
2007, been focused on a more ‘aggressive approach’, supported by more robust RoE.94 The 
Stabilisation Forces now receive pre-mission training centred around offensive action and 
delivering effects across the conflict spectrum.95 Since 2009 military exercises/training have 
increasingly sought to develop the capacity to shift operational modes at short-notice.96  
Preparing for reversibility in conflict intensity is, however, an ongoing challenge. As a BMVg 
source stated: ‘The main challenge for the commander and the soldier over the coming years 
will be to learn how to switch between operational modes’.97 This process of adaptation is, 
nevertheless, accelerating as a range of far-reaching changes to the German ‘lessons-learned’ 
process have been initiated which will enhance the Bundeswehr’s tactical and operational 
dynamism and create greater pressure for doctrinal reform. 
 
Managing Military Input to Defence Planning: Enhancing Tactical and Operational 
Dynamism 
 
It is only recently that the institutional structures which will facilitate Germany’s process of 
‘conceptual catching-up’ with her European partners and the continual adaptation of 
capabilities, doctrine and training have been established. Since 2006, Germany has taken 
important steps to improve the ‘lessons-learned’ process that evaluates the short and long-term 
implications of operations for capabilities, doctrine and training. The Bundeswehr has also 
undergone a set of institutional reforms which will quicken its transformation around the 
principles of jointness and interoperability with Alliance partners.   
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Increasing Adaptability at the Tactical and Operational Levels 
 
Before 2006 the German ‘lessons-learned’ process following military operations lacked 
coordination. During the expeditionary operations of the early 1990s an officer was appointed 
to operational headquarters with the specific responsibility for evaluating the key lessons of 
operational experiences for doctrine, capabilities, command structures and training. This officer 
delivered daily reports to sections for Einsatzauswertung (Operational Assessment) within the 
Planning Staffs, who analysed information, checked whether other units had encountered 
similar problems, agreed actions and undertook follow-up.98  
However, until recently, there has been no formalised process dealing with the broader 
(‘long-loop’) implications of operations for capabilities, jointness, interoperability and concept 
development and experimentation (CD&E).99 Following the submission of a written report from 
the Joint Commander, the Bundeswehr’s Single Services were expected to identify problems 
and suggest changes.100 Hence while the lessons-learned process was strong in determining 
the short-term implications of operations, it lacked an impartial follow-up mechanism and was 
weaker in identifying and resolving ‘long-loop’ issues.101   
The complexity of the ISAF operational environment and the increasing number of 
experiences with consequences for jointness and interoperability has prompted important 
changes to the lessons-learned process since the mid-2000s. In 2004 the InfoSysEEBw 
database was established at the Einsatzfuehrungszentrum (Bundeswehr Operations 
Command). At this stage InfoSysEEBw formed a data collection tool for the storage of 
operational reports. The key step in the transformation of the lessons-learned process was the 
June 2008 creation of the Einsatzfuehrungsstab (Operations Staff) and section for 
Einsatzauswertung. The Army has also profited from the increasing manpower allocated to the 
lessons-learned process, particularly at the German Army Forces Command, who are 
responsible for lessons-learned.102 
The section for Einsatzauswertung is tasked with assessing Operational Quality; its 
work divided into three core lessons-learned tasks: Operational Analysis/Readiness (the 
relevance of doctrine, organisation, training, leadership, personnel and capabilities); 
Operational Effectiveness (the extent to which operations succeed in delivering key effects) 
and Efficiency (cost-benefit relationships).103 Operational Analysis/Readiness has undergone 
most significant development since June 2008.104 Observations from field reports are logged 
into InfoSysEEBw, triggering initial analysis by the Bundeswehr Operations Command, who 
decide which service should lead-up analysis. The individual service must then respond with a 
plan of action and agree a timetable. Any action taken by the service, including discussions 
with other actors, such as weapons manufacturers or the Fuehreungsakademie der 
Bundeswehr, are entered into InfoSysEEBw. This process ensures that the Operations 
Command can follow-up the implementation of lessons-learned and any steps undertaken by 
contingents on the ground. Lessons are also identified through workshops and seminars with 
commanders conducted by the BTC’s Institute of Social Sciences that also prepares 
questionnaires for commanders which are completed before, during and following 
deployment.105 
InfoSysEEBw has been a very effective ‘staffing tool’ in allocating responsibilities and 
checking follow-up and as a library/database for reports from Mission Contingents. In 
conjunction with the establishment of the Einsatzfuehrungsstab and section for 
Einsatzauswertung, InfoSysEEBw has enhanced the efficiency of the collection, analysis and 
follow-up stages of the ‘short-loop’ lessons-learned process and has helped to improve key 
areas such as jointness and C2. These changes have also helped refine pre-deployment 
training exercises which focus increasingly on actual operational scenarios, and to accelerate 
training in areas suffering manpower shortages, like forward air controllers.106 In addition, the 
lessons-learned process has provided a forum to apply greater pressure to the core executive 
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to sanction the development of an explicit COIN doctrine.107 The lessons-learned process has 
been central in providing the evidence necessary to legitimate a shift towards increasingly 
offensive and robust RoE under ISAF which allow the German troops to engage insurgents 
before coming under fire.108  
The inadequate coordination of follow-up on ‘long-loop’ lessons has also seen recent 
improvement. Crucially, beginning in early 2009, the individual Services and the Bundeswehr 
Operations Command have worked jointly to identify a ‘Top List’ of the main ‘long-loop’ issues 
requiring immediate attention (the current list includes CON doctrine).109 Furthermore, the 
Einsatzsofortbedarf (Urgent Operational Requirements) has enhanced the Bundeswehr’s 
capacity to adapt to the operational environment by permitting the Services to meet vital 
capability requirements as operations evolve.110  
 
 Lessons-Learned: A Work in Progress 
 
A set of problems and difficulties have arisen since InfoSysEEBw’s inception. The first major 
problem is information overload and InfoSysEEBw’s inability to assist in ‘knowledge 
development’. While the lessons-learned process has been central in identifying equipment 
shortages and deficiencies, it has been less useful in quickly identifying and resolving issues at 
the tactical, doctrinal level. Although training and mission handover allows commanders to 
learn from the experiences of their predecessor, no search engine exists that can sort the 
relevant information for different levels of command.111 Furthermore, an emphasis on post-
mission reports remains, that does not capture the rapidly-changing nature of operations and 
enemy tactics. When tactical issues are identified, their solution, once agreed, is integrated into 
the six-month pre-deployment training course. This is a lengthy process that is unsuited to 
rapidly-changing Stabilisation/COIN operations. A set of proposals are under consideration 
which will attempt to ensure a more continuous flow of information from the field. However, 
improvement is constrained by the shortage of German infantry forces under ISAF. The urgent 
need to maximise troop presence has left little space for officers focusing on speedy report 
delivery.112  
Moreover, a continual problem of doctrinal stagnation within the individual Services 
exists that stems not only from the Denkverbot, but also from the highly-consensual manner of 
doctrinal development.113 No one individual has the capacity to over-ride objections or changes 
to doctrine, hence even minor alterations involve a highly-bureaucratic process. 114  This 
approach contrasts markedly to France and the UK where doctrine is developed in a more 
dynamic and evolutionary manner and benefits from the capacity of the ‘service agnostic’ 
CICDE (Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation) and DCDC 
(Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre) to take the initiative in leading-up change. 
 
Institutional Protection for Jointness and Interoperability 
  
The BMVg’s civilian leadership has taken important steps to endow the principles of jointness 
and interoperability with institutional protection through the development of the Bundeswehr 
Operations Command and the BTC. Since its establishment in 2004, the BTC has played a 
growing role in the development of doctrine and CD&E within the Services. The BTC is the 
intellectual and conceptual ‘muscle’ of the Joint Staff, but unlike the DCDC and CICDE, it does 
not enjoy the power to lead doctrinal and conceptual development. The BTC is more of a ‘think-
tank’, playing a coordinating role by organising working groups and workshops on doctrine and 
CD&E.115  
The BTC’s power lies in its ability to set the agenda on thinking about the key warfare 
scenarios guiding the trajectory of transformation. Lobbying the BTC and cooption of the 
organisation at the early stages of conceptual development around doctrine and capabilities is 
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viewed as increasingly vital by the Services.116 Furthermore, the BTC’s competencies are 
gradually expanding. The organisation has, for example, begun to work closely with Federal 
Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB) project managers in order to promote 
increased harmonisation within the capability programme.117 The BTC is also trying to expand 
its resources and role in coordinating doctrinal development across the Bundeswehr.118 
Indeed, the urgency of adapting to the agenda of jointness has fostered receptiveness 
within the Single Services to reforms to their structures, to allow closer cooperation with 
international partners in doctrine and CD&E. Such changes are viewed by the Services as a 
vital means to enhance their influence over transformation. For example, the Luftwaffe began a 
structural reorganisation in January 2006 to allow it to respond more rapidly to the operational 
environment. The restructuring facilitated a closer relationship with NATO’s Joint Air Power 
Competence Centre (JAPCC) and cooperation with NATO by reflecting the Atlantic Alliance’s 
command structures. In this way, the Luftwaffe is more exposed to the lessons of ‘best practice’ 
consequent upon the experiences of her NATO partners and can better hone its 
interoperability. These changes also allowed the Luftwaffe as to secure influence within the 
Ministerial-level Coordination Group for Transformation and BTC by adding gravitas to 
proposals.119 
Furthermore, the Luftmachtzentrum (Air Power Centre), created in 2006, draws 
together the conceptual and operational work of the Luftwaffe Command sections for planning, 
telecommunications and operating procedures and leads up CD&E. The organisation provides 
the conceptual input for the Working Group on Luftwaffe Transformation that takes the main 
decisions on the Luftwaffe’s approach to NEC/EBAO and determines the capability proposals 
will put to the Coordination Croup for Transformation. The Luftmachtzentrum also liaises 
closely with the BTC and JAPCC, adding greater weight to these proposals.120  
Hence, despite the delay in its introduction (when compared to Britain and France), the 
jointness agenda is being rapidly disseminated throughout the Bundeswehr.121 There is also 
increasing cross-service cooperation in approaches to the use of the sea as a basis for land 
and air deployments, on air-land integration and C2 interoperability. 122  The consensual 
approach to the development of military doctrine has a positive effect on the development of 
joint doctrine, due to the high-level of collaboration between the Services.123  
Some institutional resistance has been present to the rapid changes wrought since 
2003. A ‘them and us’ attitude toward the development of a culture of jointness and to the role 
of the Joint Staff in leading up projects continues to persist within certain sections of the 
Services.124 This opposition is, however, being rapidly eliminated, not only through the changes 
outlined above but also through reforms to training, such as the Advanced Joint Staff Course 
delivered by the Fuehrungsakademie since 2004 that is spreading the principle of jointness 
throughout the separate Planning Staffs.125 It is, therefore, increasingly recognised within the 
Planning Staffs that for a service to thrive it must comply with jointness and interoperability. It is 
also important to note that many sections of the BMVg had privately become disillusioned with 
the retention of territorial defence until 2003.126 The focus on jointness that has accompanied 
the early stages of transformation therefore gained broad support as a means with which to 
renew the Bundeswehr’s relevance in multinational operations. 
These organisational changes are enhancing the Bundeswehr’s capacity to respond to 
the operational environment. The process of Einsatzauswertung is also developing the 
institutional mechanisms to enhance the dynamism of Bundeswehr in ascertaining and 
implementing the implications of operations for doctrine, capabilities and training. However, 
translating these lessons into changes to the capability programme and force posture is 
hampered by organisational politics between the Single Services. This problem is worsened by 
the impact of low executive autonomy.  
 
Military Input to Capability Acquisition: The Exacerbation of Organisational Politics 
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There is a significant inter-Service competition over the definition of the measures necessary 
for the solution of ‘long-loop’ issues.127 The ‘Top List’ is agreed at the Coordination and 
Decision Committee that examines the individual Services’ proposals. The Committee includes 
representatives from the individual Services, the Coordination Group for Transformation, the 
Abteilung Ruestung (Capabilities Department of the MoD), BTC, and specialists in CD&E and 
training. This broad constituency helps to ensure that solutions are not endorsed which clash 
with operational requirements. Moreover, institutional protection for financial constraints is 
provided by the presence of representatives of the MoD Budgetary Section. The work of the 
Coordination and Decision Committee has been accompanied by the establishment in 2009 of 
two steering committees (one at the level of the Einsatzfuehrung; the other at Desk Officer 
level) responsible for coordinating the implementation of ‘long-loop’ lessons-learned.  
However, the decision-making authority on the prioritisation of major changes to 
capabilities, doctrine and training rests with the Military Advisory Board. This Board is 
dominated by military input, consisting of the Director of the Joint Operational Staff, Chiefs of 
Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Medical Services and Logistical Support in addition to the 
Generalinspekteur. The Board forms an arena for organisational politics between the Services, 
restricting the flow of operational lessons into the capability and equipment programme.128 The 
Bundeswehr Operations Command is, therefore, examining mechanisms to further strengthen 
the efficiency and objectivity of the identification of solutions to lessons-learned by seeking 
more extensive input from the BTC and NATO Centres of Excellence.129      
However, the Single Service Chiefs also enjoy significant agenda-setting power on 
broader military capability procurement. The Services’ capacity to secure the agreement of the 
Generalinspekteur and civilian leadership for investment in their main capability projects 
depends upon the support of the other two branches of the armed forces as well as the 
Streitkraeftebasis and Zentrale Sanitaetsdienst (Central Medical Service). This consensual 
dynamic acts to the detriment of objective decision-making. It also allows organisational politics 
to emerge in debates at higher-levels of the MoD (such as the Coordination Group for 
Transformation) on the adoption of conceptual articles and lessons-learned with far-reaching 
implications for capability acquisition.130  
Although the organisational structures charged with the implementation of capability 
projects (the BWB and MoD’s IT Department) are composed predominantly of civil servants, 
the agenda-setting process on military capabilities is dominated by military input, particularly 
from the Service Chiefs through the Integrated Working Group for Capability Analysis (IAGFA). 
IAGFA is the key forum for debates on procurement, including Einsatzsofortbedarf, and is 
composed of representatives of the Bundeswehr Chiefs of Staff, Director General of 
Armaments, Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, Director of Defence Administration, IT 
Director and MoD Budget Director. IAGFA translates the broader direction on capabilities and 
force postures provided by the 2006 Defence White Paper and Coordination Group for 
Transformation into major decisions on capability procurement.  
The Coordination Group for Transformation and IAGFA were described by one MoD 
source as a ‘bazaar’ and ‘log-rolling’ exercise, in which the Services trade-off support for each 
others’ ‘glamour’ projects.131  This situation is worsened by the lack of subordination of the 
Service Chiefs to the Generalinspekteur, who acts as in an advisory role to the Defence 
Minister and whose only formal power over the Services rests in his ability to relieve the 
Service Chiefs of their command. 132  As a consequence, while former Generalinspekteur 
Wolfgang Schneiderhan (2002-09) was able to promote a focus on networked, joint and 
interoperable forces, his ability to translate these principles into more fundamental reforms to 
military capabilities/force postures was restricted.133    
In contrast to France and the UK, where windows of opportunity to make significant 
changes to force posture and capability projects emerge following Presidential/Parliamentary 
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elections, German Defence Ministers face much narrower executive autonomy due to the 
regularity of Land elections. Organisational politics is not so much a causal variable as it is a 
reflection of the constraints of the Federal political system on Defence Ministers’ capacity to 
take unpopular decisions on base closures and the core executive’s sensitivity to job losses in 
the defence industry.134 As a source within the German BMVg noted: ‘In Germany we have two 
(Land) elections per year. Furthermore, the presence of powerful regional politicians makes it 
very difficult possibility to push through radical reform to capability acquisition or force 
postures’.135 For example, the 6 Type 212 submarines ordered between 1996 and 2006, while 
of little use to the expeditionary challenges of the post-Cold War era, are of critical importance 
to the survival of manufacturers Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (Schleswig-Holstein) and 
Thyssen Nordseewerke (Lower-Saxony). This lack of political will to reform the capability 
acquisition process also limits the ability of ‘service agnostic’ organisations like the BTC and 
Bundeswehr Operational Command to foster greater objectivity in conceptual development and 
capability procurement.136  
There is, however, greater possibility for civilian intervention to ensure that the 
equipment and capability programme remains in line with budgetary constraints. Parliament 
has the right to make decisions on the purchase of equipment and capabilities costing over €25 
million. This instrument is, however, somewhat blunt, as oversight is restricted to rejecting the 
project or reducing the size of an order. Moreover, parliamentary control further disincentivises 
alterations to capability investment as once projects are approved the funding cannot be 
switched to alternative projects without repeating the arduous negotiations with Bundestag’s 
Budgetary Committee.137  
Parliament also enjoys the right to approve the Bundeswehr’s budget, setting tight 
overall financial constraints on procurement. However, in conjunction with ineffective civilian 
control over the content of procurement, such financial constraints make it harder for the 
military to integrate shift serious UORs into the equipment programme. As a result of these 
problems, the BMVg is considering the introduction of a ‘Spiral Development Model’ that 
introduces capabilities at 80% of their technological potential.138  
The German Federal Auditing Office (FAO) is also mandated to investigate defence 
procurement projects. The FAO’s oversight capacity is, however, circumscribed by the limited 
manpower devoted to this task.139 In addition, data acquired on time slippage and cost over-
runs is unavailable in the public domain. As a senior figure in the BMVg highlighted: ‘This lack 
of transparency and accountability lies in a complex mesh of interests which are allowed to 
prevail due to a lack of political will to reform the acquisition process that derives from the 
reticence of politicians to take on the German defence industry’.140 As a consequence, reforms 
designed to streamline the relationship between the Bundeswehr and defence industry such as 
the 2001 Customer Product Management Scheme have had minimal impact on the efficiency 
and adaptability of the procurement process.141  
 
Conclusions: The Bundeswehr’s Stunted Growth and the Avenues for Future Research 
 
Incentivised by low executive autonomy, civilian policy-makers in post-Cold War Germany have 
exerted excessive interference in military doctrine. This situation contrasts markedly to the UK 
and French militaries, where higher executive autonomy permitted the instigation of institutional 
reforms designed to foster dynamism at the tactical and operational levels of defence planning 
a much earlier stage in the post-Cold War era.142 The Denkverbot that was put in place by 
civilian policy leaders has left the BMVg with an atmosphere that is unreceptive to critical 
thinking and open debate on the implications of operational experience for doctrine and 
training. The doctrinal deficiencies on COIN in HDV 100/100 (2007) are, therefore, unsurprising 
given the conceptual stagnation that existed within the BMVg during the Denkverbot, and the 
delay in the shift to expeditionary operations. This problem is exacerbated by the Bundeswehr’s 
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sparse historical experience in countering insurgency. Nevertheless, the increasingly-rigorous 
lessons-learned process that has been instigated since 2003 suggests an increasingly fertile 
environment for tactical and operational dynamism. 
 The article has also identified significant deficits in German military capabilities, not 
only in C2ISR, but also in the areas of effective engagement and tactical and strategic mobility. 
Hamstrung by low executive autonomy, Germany’s political elite lacks the will and ability to 
overcome organisational politics between the individual Services due to the importance of key 
’platform-based’ weapons projects to German industry and the narrow windows of opportunity 
to affect radical change. Although post-2003 changes to the content of capability procurement 
will deliver C2ISR and other capabilities relevant for expeditionary ‘Three Block Warfare’ 
conflict scenarios, they will do so at a much later stage than the British and French equipment 
programmes. This restricts Germany’s capacity to participate in higher-intensity operations 
under ISAF. Consequently, while traveling the road to convergence, the Bundeswehr remains, 
for the time being, deficient in undertaking ‘Three Block Warfare’ and incapable of participating 
in combat operations of the scale and intensity of those conducted by the British and US in 
Southern Afghanistan.143 As a source within the German BMVg stated: ‘You can’t expect a five 
year-old to do the same tasks as an eighteen year-old’.144  
 The study has important implications for empirical research on European defence 
reforms as well as the theoretical literature on the sources of military change. It draws attention 
to the need for a closer focus on civil-military relations in defence planning and on the precise 
balance that should be struck between civilian and military input to effective defence planning. 
The literature on post-Cold War European defence reform is remarkably quiet on this timely 
and important subject.145 The study also raises implications for theoretical debates on defence 
reform. It demonstrates that although the forces of international structure form the central 
variable driving the content of defence reform, the timing of reform at the strategic, operational 
and tactical levels of defence planning146 is dependent, not upon strategic or organisational 
culture, or, indeed, upon organisational politics. The key intervening domestic-level variable is, 
instead, the autonomy of the core executive in defence policy. Furthermore, while the article 
identifies Neoclassical Realism as the theoretical framework that provides greatest analytical 
leverage, it points to the utility of a highly-materialist form of the theory. In doing so, the study 
adds greater parsimony to a Neoclassical Realist literature that is characterised by a significant 
level of contestation on the nature of the unit-level variables which impact upon the timing of 
states’ convergence with systemic imperatives.147  
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